Western New England Law Review
Volume 7 7 (1984-1985)
Issue 4

Article 5

1-1-1985

MUNICIPAL FINANCE—CORPORATE
SECURITIES: THE EYE OF A
STORM—Chemical Bank v. Washington Public
Power Supply System, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d
329 (1983)
John J. Ferriter

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
John J. Ferriter, MUNICIPAL FINANCE—CORPORATE SECURITIES: THE EYE OF A STORM—Chemical Bank v. Washington
Public Power Supply System, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983), 7 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 949 (1985),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol7/iss4/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

MUNICIPAL FINANCE-CORPORATE SECURITIES: THE EYE OF
A STORM-Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply Sys
tem, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2154 (1985).

I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 15,1983, the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated
a contract ultimately causing the largest municipal bond default in his
tory.1 Because the ruling2 affected at least 78,000 bondholders and the
bond 3 default generated approximately 70 lawsuits, a large audience
followed the appeal. 4
Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply SystemS posed
the issue whether tax-exempt municipal bonds that the Washington
Public Power Supply System (System)6 had issued to finance the con
struction of two nuclear power plants to supply electricity to 88 differ
ent publicly-owned utilities would be repaid. 7 When the System's
inability to obtain further financing forced it to terminate the project, 8
the issue became whether the electric ratepayers or the bond purchas
ers would pay the architectural, engineering, and construction costs
incurred before the date of termination. 9
This note will explore how the Supreme Court of Washington in
1. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666
P.2d 329 (1983). See also, Wall St. J., June 16, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
2. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at D22, col. 6.
3. Alexander, Whoops! A $2 Billion Blunder, Time, August 8, 1983, at 50.
4. On November 6, 1984, the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed its June 15,
1983 decision. 691 P.2d 524 (Wash. 1984).
5. 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
6. See infra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
7. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 777-78, 666 P.2d at 332.
8. Id. Moody's Investor Service had suspended credit ratings on the System's bonds.
N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at D22, col. 5: see also Brown, The Paper World, Wash. Post,
Dec. 5, 1984, at A17, col. 1.
9. Unlike privately-owned utilities, publicly-owned utilities have no stockholders
who could share the risk of a terminated project. For a discussion of the issues involved
when a private utility cancels a nuclear generating facility, see Note, Electric Utility Rate
Regulation: Regulating The Shock: Abandonment of Nuclear Power Plant Construction, 7
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 961 (1985).
Also, the System could not accept the business risk of cancellation because it had no
source of revenue apart from payments from the participants. See infra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text.
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Chemical Bank resolved the battle between the ratepayers and the
bondholders, ignoring a controlling line of cases to reach its result. By
freeing the ratepayers from arm's-length contracts that required their
suppliers to pay the non-recoverable costs of terminated nuclear power
plants, the decision in Chemical Bank will prevent the bondholders
from receiving $7.2 billion over a thirty year period. 1O
II.

BACKGROUND

The System is an operating agencyll and a municipal corpora
l2
tion established under Washington law.B In 1983,14 23 municipal
utilities and public utility districts constituted its members. IS The leg
islation governing the operation of the System mandates a board of
directors with one representative on the board for each member. 16 It
also requires that the board make management and control
decisions. 17
As conceived, the System would enable small publicly-owned
utilities to achieve greater market power l8 when purchasing wholesale
electricity or building generating facilities, thereby maintaining rates
that would be competitive with larger, often privately-owned, utili
ties. 19 The cost of a particular project could be decreased under en
10. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 331.
11. Id. An operating agency is a consortium of governmental units formed to pro
vide economic service by pooling resources to achieve increased market power. Ferdon,
Power Utilities Realize Cost Benefits on Joint Agency Take or Pay Contracts, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
25, 1982, at 17, col. 1.
12. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 777, 666 P.2d at 331.
13. Id.
14. Alexander, supra note 3, at 51.
15. Id. A public utility district is a municipal corporation which buys and sells
power, al)d its service territory may encompass several municipalities. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 54.04.020-.030 (1962).
16. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.370 (1983).
17. Id. It is important that the representatives of the ratepayers freely entered agree
ments in which they knowingly accepted the risk that the plants might have to be termi
nated especially when considering their responsibility for repaying the bonds. Brown,
supra note 8, at 1.
18. See Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17, col. 2.
19. In Chemical Bank the large scale plant took the form of a nuclear power station,
a project that the participants would not have been able to construct themselves. Chemi
cal's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 78, Chemical
Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., No. 82-2-06840-3 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1982)
[hereinafter referred to as Chemical's Memorandum]; see Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17, col.

2.
The idea of promoting competition in the electric utility industry by encouraging the
public ownership of generating facilities dates back to 1920. 16 U.S.c. § 800(a)(1976)
(granting a preference to public bodies in the licensing of hydroelectric facilities); see also
City 0/ Bountiful. Utah. Opinion No. 88, 11 FERC para. 61,337 (1980), affd sub nom.
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abling legislation that permits the System to enter into contracts
"relating to the purchase, sale, interchange or wheeling of power"
with any governmental unit or utility.20
With the goal of supplying needed energy at the lowest cost, the
System formed in 1957 21 under a statute that authorized operating
agencies to generate electricity, employ professional services, and
study the development of electric generating facilities. 22 The System
decided to begin constructing two additional nuclear generating facili
ties in 1974. 23 Prior to undertaking the project, however, the System
needed approval of a majority of the governing bodies of its
members.24
Eighty-eight member and non-member utilities subsequently
signed participation agreements in which the System promised to pro
vide a specific percentage of project capability25 and the utilities prom
ised to pay a specific percentage of the project's annual budget. 26
Because the System would finance construction costs for each partici
pant utility until the facility produced power, it drafted the agreement
to require each participant to reimburse the System for borrowed
funds even if it never completed the project. 27 The System deemed the
language necessary because as an operating agency, it could raise capi
tal only through revenues from sales and bonds that would be repaid
by the revenue. 28 Further, the provision was equitable because if an
Alabama Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulation Com'n, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983); 16 U.S.c. 936(b)(1)(l976) (directing that 50% of the
inexpensive electricity produced at the federally-financed project at Niagra Falls be sold to
public bodies for the use of residential customers).
20. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.391 (1983).
21. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 773, 666 P.2d at 331.
22. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.300 (1983).
23. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 773, 666 P.2d at 331. The System had already
begun construction on three others. Id. One past president of the System compared the
1970's nuclear expansion with the foresighted hydroelectric development of the Columbia
River, exemplified by such projects as the Grand Coulee Darn. Brown, Darkness to Dawn,
Wash. Post, Dec. 2, 1984, at A21, col. 2.
24. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.360 (1983).
25.
'Project Capability' is defined in section l(v) of the agreement as: the
amounts of electric power and energy, if any, which the Projects are capable of
generating at any particular time (including times when either or both of the
Plants are not operable or operating or the operation thereof is suspended, inter
rupted, interfered with, reduced or curtailed, in each case in whole or in part for
any reason whatsover), less project station use and losses.
Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 778, 666 P.2d at 332.
26. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 777, 666 P.2d at 332.
27. Even in 1976 termination presented a large enough risk to require an agreement
to address risk allocation. Id.; see Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17-18.
28. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.300(6) (1983). The System, therefore, could
not feasibly assume the risk of termination because of its total dependence on the parties
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individual participant built a project by itself, it could legally service
the debt incurred to finance a terminated facility.29
Elected public officials made the power supply decisions for the
public utility districts that signed the agreement. 30 Although some of
ficials who served on the governing boards received nominal compen
sation,3! they had been delegated the delicate and technical task of
searching for and contracting the most inexpensive supply of electric
ity which would be reliably available in 15 or 20 years. 32
In 1976, the agreement which the System offered represented a
low cost energy supply33 that the officials believed forecasts of a grow
ing demand for electricity necessitated. 34 The increasing demand ren
dered the probability of termination small though existent. 35 After
reviewing studies, the officials chose what they judged the best product
on the market, even with the risk that ratepayers might pay construc
tion costs but ultimately receive no electricity.36
The agreement provided the participants with a method of con
trolling management decisions 37 and each would be guaranteed per
centage of the units output if the project were completed. 38 Although
the agreement did not precisely follow the procedure for nuclear de
velopment delineated in the Washington statutes, it did create a com
with which it had contracted for construction and operating capital. Ferdon, supra note
11, at 17-18. The legislative scheme of an operating agency rendered it little more than a
shell composed of governmental units which used it for the financing, construction, and
operation of electric generating facilities. Note, Chemical Bank v. Washington Public
Power Supply System, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1094, 1116-17 (1984).
29. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.3411 (1983).
30. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 54.12.010 (West Supp. 1985). Being elected, a board
would theoretically not act contrary to the perceived desires of its ratepayers.
31. Brown, supra note 23, at A21, col. 2. The annual revenue of a public utility
district determines the compensation scheme for each district's commissioner. WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 54.12.080 (West Supp. 1985).
32. Brown, Prophets of Shortage, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1984, at A18, col. 3.
33. Cook, Nuclear Follies, Forbes, Feb. 11, 1985, at 84.
34. Brown, supra note 32, at A 18, col. 1.
35. The main object of the agreement was to generate electric power, even though
section 6 provided for payments to the System regardless of whether it completed the
projects. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 778, 666 P.2d at 332.
36. Apparently, a seller's market existed, since the Bonneville Power Administration
(BP A) sent a letter to the participants stating that a constant supply of electricity could be
guaranteed only if they accepted the agreements. Brown, supra note 32, at A18, col. 1.
37. Note, supra note 28, at 1110-12. Section 15 of the agreement mandated the es
tablishment of a participants' committee to oversee the management of the projects. Chem
ical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337.
38. The agreement provided that the participant would purchase a share of the "elec
tric power and energy, if any, which the Projects are capable of generating at any particular
time." Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 778, 666 P.2d at 332.
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parable relationship. 39 In return for the System's promise to sell a
portion of the facilities' capability, each participant promised to collect
rates sufficient to service the System's project-related debt. 40 Further,
each participant delivered to the System an opinion of its counsel that
the agreement was enforceable in accordance with its terms. 4\
On January 22, 1982, the System's directors determined that the
System would be unable to obtain financing to complete the facilities
and voted to terminate both projects.42 Prior to termination, the Sys
tem had issued $2.25 billion of tax-exempt municipal revenue bonds to
finance the cost of architectural, engineering, and construction services
associated with the projects. 43 A complex bond resolution that the
System's directors adopted on February 23, 1977 governed issuance
and repayment of the bonds. 44 Among other matters, it appointed
Chemical Bank as trustee for the bondholders. 45
As trustee, Chemical Bank brought a declaratory judgment ac
tion in the Superior Court for King County, Washington, against the
System and each participant seeking a ruling that the participants
were contractually obligated to pay the System an amount sufficient to
service the principal and interest on the bonds. 46 After reviewing an
overwhelming amount of oral and written argument, the trial court
ruled in favor of Chemical Bank. 47 Several participants then appealed
and the Washington Supreme Court granted review' of the partici
pants' statutory authority to enter the agreement that formed the se
curity for the bonds. 48
Writing for the majority, Justice Brachtenback held that the par
ticipants had exceeded their statutory authority because the agreement
represented neither a "purchase of electricity" nor an "acquisition of
39. Under the joint development statute, participants receive an ownership interest,
but they still must pay construction costs if a project is cancelled, even though they will
never receive electricity. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 54.55.010-030 (West Supp. 1985).
40. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 778, 666 P.2d at 332.
41. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
42. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 331; See Brown, supra note 8, at
AI7, col. 3. Although individuals affiliated with the member publicly-owned utilities con
trol the board, the board's executive committee is specifically required to consider its inter
est to be the same as the interests of "all ratepayers affected by the joint operating agency."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.374(3) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). The lan
guage is broad enough to require the board to analyze the interests of non-member partici
pant ratepayers as well as those of members.
.
43. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 331.
44. Id. at 777, 666 P.2d at 332.
45. Id. at 776, 666 P.2d at 331.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 780-81, 666 P.2d at 333-34.
48. Id. at 781, 666 P.2d at 334.
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an electric generating facility" and declared the contracts void. 49 The
Court announced its decision on June 15, 1983. On July 25, 1983, the
System sent notice to Chemical Bank that it could not fund the next
semi-annual interest payment due on the bonds and that it was in de
fault under the terms of the bond resolution. 50

III.

ANALYSIS

Chapter 43.52 of the Washington Code regulates the formation
and operation of governmental agencies such as the System. 51 Under
section 391, the System possesses the power to "make contracts for
any term relating to the purchase, sale, interchange or wheeling of
power" with any public body or utility. 52 Under the statute, therefore,
the System's has quite broad authority to contract for the purchase or
sale of electricity.53
Under Section 43.52.300, operating agencies have the additional
power to enter into contracts with any public body for the "construc
tion of all or any part of any electric generating [facility]."54 The rela
tionship created by the agreement between the System and each
participant shows that their purpose was to finance and construct elec
tric generating facilities. 55
The Supreme Court of Washington has addressed the issue of
contractual authority many times. In 1933, the court announced in
Abrams v. Seattle 56 that it would follow its prior rule and apply the
same standard of contract enforceability to a municipal utility as to a
private individual. 57 Courts of other states strictly construe contracts
in favor of municipalities.58 In Seattle, Abrams sought an injunction
against the city to prevent payments to private entrepreneurs who had
constructed an electric substation on city-owned property, based on
49. Id. at 799, 666 P.2d at 343. Further, the court did not require the participants to
pay any restitution or other equitable remedy, leaving the System in a position in which it
would be completely unable to meet its contractual obligations to the bondholders.
50. Asinof, WPPSS Default on $2.25 Billion in Bonds is Record for Municipal Debt;
Suits Seen, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at 3, col. 4.
51. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.391 (1983); see generally, Ferdon, supra note
II,atI7-18.
52. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.391 (1983) (emphasis added).
53. Even if the agreements do not represent a purchase of electricity, they undeniably
"related to" the purchase of electrical power. See supra note 57 and accompanying test.
54. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.53.300(3) (1983).
55. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 782, 666 P.2d at 335.
56. 173 Wash. 495, 23 P.2d 869 (1933).
57. Id. at 501, 23 P.2d at 871.
58. Id.
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the theory that the city's lease for the property was ultra vires. 59 Rec
ognizing the equities of the situation, the court ordered the city to pay
the reasonable value of the services rendered on an implied contract
theory.60
Thirty-two years later, in the textbook case of Edwards v. Ren
ton,61 the court cited the decision in Seattle with approval and recog
nized that Washington would permit recovery against municipal
corporations for ultra vires contracts in situations in which other
states would not. 62 When the City of Renton had entered an agree
ment which was ultra vires because of the particular financial arrange
ment, the court allowed a quasi-contractual recovery, stating that it
recognized "ample authority from other jurisdictions which would
deny any recovery to plaintiffs" once a municipal contract has been
adjudicated ultra vires. 63 Further, the court concluded that, unlike
other jurisdictions, Washington would even calculate the recovery
based on the value of the services rendered, as opposed to the value of
the benefit received. 64
As recently as 1974, the Washington Supreme Court acknowl
edged a "developing tendency" to hold public bodies to the "same
standards of conduct [as] ... private citizens."65 In Washington v.
O'Connell,66 the court enforced invalid contracts of publicly-owned
electric utilities because the contracts contained "mere procedural ir
regularities" and because the court recognized that enforcement was
"necessary to do justice between the parties. "67
The O'Connell court recognized the general rule that parties con
tracting with a municipality do so at their own risk, and that the law
presumes that a party dealing with the public officer knows the limits
of the statutory powers of the office. 68 Because the rule protected the
public treasury, the O'Connell court established an exception to the
59. Id.
60. Id. at 503, 23 P.2d at 872.
61. 67 Wash. 2d 598,409 P.2d 153 (1965).
62. Id. at 606, 409 P.2d at 159.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 607, 409 P.2d at 159. Importantly, the court's conclusion represents an
alternative basis of recovery if a fact finder were to determine that the participants received
nothing of value. As unfortunate as it is that no electricity will ever be produced, it does
not alter the fact that millions of dollars have nevertheless been spent by the System for
engineering, architectural, and contracting services. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 776,
666 P.2d at 331.
65. Washington v. O'Connell, 83 Wash. 2d 797, 836, 523 P.2d 873, 896 (1974).
66. 83 Wash. 2d 797, 523 P.2d 873 (1974).
67. Id. at 835-36, 523 P.2d at 895.
68. Id. at 827, 523 P.2d at 892.
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rule that contracts should be strictly construed in favor of cities and
towns for instances in which municipalities perform a proprietary
function which does not represent a substantial threat to the tax
payer.69 The court reasoned that because operating revenues often
fund proprietary contracts, no serious threat existed that an imprudent
officer could cause an astronomical increase in property taxes because
of a bad business decision. 70
The O'Connell court reaffirmed the production and sale of elec
tricity as a proprietary function 71 and it held that when a party acting
in good faith enters a contract with a public officer who has the appar
ent authority to consummate the proprietary agreement, the private
party may recover the reasonable value of the services under the the
ory of unjust enrichment, even though the contract itself is later held
unenforceable. 72 The court concluded that when municipalities cloak
their officers with the apparent authority to enter a contract by passing
resolutions approving the arrangement and later acquiesce in the con
tract's performance, they cannot rely on a procedural irregularity to
withhold payments for services rendered. 73
The O'Connell decision rested on the policy that voiding munici
pal contracts often produced inequitable results. 74 Consequently, the
court noted the growing trend to treat public bodies the same as pri
vate individuals during the adjudication of contractual disputes. 75
Four years after O'Connell, the court reviewed the legality of
water contracts which provided security for municipal bonds issued by
the City of Anacortes. 76 In the 1978 case of Scott Paper Co. v. Ana
cortes,77 the city attempted to increase water rates above the contract
price, but the court refused to allow the city to renege on its promise. 78
69. Id. at 828-35, 523 P.2d at 892-95.
70. For example, the agreement between the System and the participants provided
that their payments can only come from revenues derived from the sale of electricity, not
tax dollars. Memorandum of Washington Public Power Supply System in Support of
Chemical Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to the Motions for
Summary Judgment by Various of the Defendant Participants at V-16, Chemical Bank v.
Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., No. 82-2-06840-3 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1982) [hereinafter re
ferred to as System's Memorandum]; see generally, Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17.
71. O'Connell, 83 Wash. 2d at 834, 523 P.2d at 895.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 836, 523 P.2d at 896.
75. Id.
76. Scott Paper Co. v. Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 27-28, 578 P.2d 1292, 1297
(1978).
77. 90 Wash. 2d 19, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978).
78. Id. at 31, 578 P.2d 1298.
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Emphasizing the importance of the agreements for the marketability
of the city's bonds, the court enforced the contract. 79 Writing for the
majority, Justice Horowitz stated that the authority to sell bonds
would be "meaningless" without the "necessarily implied power" to
do "whatever is reasonably and lawfully necessary to make such bonds
sound and salable. "80 Scott Paper Co. represents further evidence of
the trend toward enforcing municipal contracts.
The courts of Washington have also enforced ultra vires munici
pal contracts when the person contracting with the municipality acted
in good faith. 81 The most recent case that awarded recovery to a good
faith contracting party is the 1982 Noel v. Cole,82 which involved a suit
to enjoin the sale of timber from public land without preparation of an
environmental impact statement. 83 In Noel, the majority opinion de
termined that the govenmental unit possessed the general authority to
sell the timber, but "merely. . . exercised it in an irregular manner or
by unauthorized procedural means."84 Consequently, the court held
that if a statutory violation involved a procedural irregularity and the
activity was not blatantly against public policy, "a private party acting
in good faith may recover to the extent necessary to prevent 'manifest
unjustice' or unjust enrichment."85
The above cases indicate that the common law of Washington has
developed several exceptions to the general rule that municipal con
tracts should be strictly construed. By placing the risk of termination
on the bond purchasers, contrary to the terms of the participation
agreement, the court in Chemical Bank ignored both the law of Wash
ington and the realities of the market for municipal bonds. The court
refused to enforce the agreement between the System and the partici
pants because it could find no express statutory authority for the par
ticipants to assume the risk of termination nor any compelling reason
to imply such a power. 86 It could have authorized the agreement
either as a contract relating to the sale of electricity or for the con
79. Id.
80. Id. at 29, 578 P.2d at 1298. In 1971, the court had recognized the need for
financing flexibility. Public Uti!. Dist. No. I v. Taxpayers & Ratepayers, 78 Wash. 2d 724,
726,479 P.2d 61, 63 (1971).
81. See e.g. Renton, 67 Wash. 2d at 603, 409 P.2d at 157; Bremerton v. Kitsap ety.
Sewer Dist., 71 Wash. 2d 689, 698-99, 430 P.2d 956, 962 (1967); Public Uti!. Dist. No. I v.
Taxpayers & Ratepayers, 78 Wash. 2d 724, 731, 479 P.2d 61, 64 (1971); O'Connell, 83
Wash. 2d at 804, 523 P.2d at 880; Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d at 26, 578 P.2d at 1296.
82. 98 Wash. 2d 375, 655 P.2d 245 (1982).
83. Id. at 377, 655 P.2d at 247.
84. Id. at 381, 655 P.2d at 249-250.
85. Id. (citations ommitted).
86. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 798, 666 P.2d at 342.
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struction of an electric plant. 87 The fact that most of the participants
used the System merely as a financing mechanism for their chosen
business contracts which included a known business risk strengthens
the argument in favor of enforcement.88
Historically, the courts of Washington have implied contractual
authority to municipalities when necessary to provide security for
bonds and when the contracting municipal officer had the apparent
authority to bind the municipality.89 Moreover, Washington has vol
untarily labeled itself a state which will enforce municipal contracts to
the same extent as private contracts. 90 The Chemical Bank court,
therefore, should have decided differently because the agreement was
necessary to make the bonds saleable. 91 Support for a contrary deci
sion rests on two facts: counsel for the participants represented that
they had full legal power to enter into the agreement,92 and the gov
erning bodies of the participants passed resolutions binding their orga
nizations to the terms of the agreement. 93 In addition, both Seattle
and Renton represent situations in which the city had the power to
perform the acts required by the contract, but a court held it ultra
vires because of a procedural irregularity.94 The court in Chemical
Bank implied that it would have enforced the agreement if the "proce
dure" for participant control of project management had been more
extensive. 95 Although the agreement provided for such a procedure,
the court held that it was "insufficient to allow the participants to con
trol their risk. "96 The court's conclusion violates its own precedent
87. At least five other courts have alJowed such contracts. See generally Johnson v.
Piedmont Mun. Power Agency, 277 S.c. 345,287 S.E.2d 476 (1982); Texas v. Texas Mun.
Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Commissioners of Louisiana Mun.
Power Comm'n. v. AlJ Taxpayers, Property Owners & Citizens, 355 So.2d 578 (La. Ct.
App. 1978); Frank v. Cody, 572 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1977); Thompson v. Mun. Elec. Auth.,
238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976). The Chemical Bank court cites statutes in Maine,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia which specificalJy authorize munic
ipal utilities to accept the risk of termination. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 784, 666
P.2d at 337.
88. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at II-II; see generally, Ferdon, supra note
11.
89. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
91. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-16; Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17-18.
92. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-30 to 31.
93. 'Id.
94. Renton, 67 Wash. 2d at 602, 409 P.2d at 157; Seattle, 173 Wash. at 500, 23 P.2d
at 871.
95. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 784, 666 P.2d at 337.
96. Id.
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and the public policy enunciated in Seattle and Renton. 97
In Chemical Bank, surprisingly little mention was made of the
agreements serving as security for $7.2 billion in municipal revenue
bonds. 98 The requirement of paying for plants that will never produce
electricity transformed the issuance of bonds from a favored tool for
public financing to a point of contention for local ratepayers.99 The
realities of the arrangement suggest that because the System had no
revenue independent of sales to the participants, the bonds would not
have been salable if the System had had to bear the risk of term ina
tion.loo Further, the System performed no forecasting or planning
services for either members or non-members.101 It makes less sense,
therefore, for the System to bear the risk of termination, even if it were
possible for the System to do so, since the participants were completely
responsible for estimating their own future power requirements and
contracting to fulfill those requirements. 102
Throughout the opinion in Chemical Bank, the court placed no
weight on the good or bad faith of the bondholders, even though the
ratepayers were described as "unsuspecting individuals."103 The court
should have acknowledged that the bondholders were unsuspecting as
well. The bondholders purchased securities with the belief that the
bonds were secured by the promises of participating municipal utilites
to collect rates sufficient to service the interest and principal due on
the bonds. 104 Similarly, the bond purchasers were aware of the Sys
tem's promise to collect charges for electricity from the participants
sufficient to repay the bonds.105 While the ratepayers could control
the governing boards of the participants lO6 and the participants could
97. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
98. In one of the courts few references to the bonds, it merely stated that U[t]he Bond
Resolution in tum . . . requires [the System] to collect and set aside funds sufficient to
make payments on the bonds." Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 777, 666 P.2d at 332.
99. The same participants who objected to the agreement in Chemical Bank have
financed several other projects with agreements in which they specifically accepted the risk
of termination. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-14 to 18; see generally,
Ferdon, supra note 11.
100. Chemical's Memorandum, supra note 19 at 27; System's Memorandum, supra
note 70, at VI-34; Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17-18; see supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
101. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-IS.
102. See affidavit of Glendale B. Horowitz, System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at
V-IS to 16.
103. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 784, 666 P.2d at 342.
104. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
105. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-16.
106. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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control the management of the project,107 the bondholders were pow
erless with respect to day-to-day decisions.108 The only reason most
bondholders associated themselves with the System and the partici
pants was because of the appearance of a conservative, tax-free
investment. 109
Thus, the ratepayers chose to enter the electric utility business
and delegate management decisions to the expertise of board mem
bers, liD while the bondholders were merely financiers looking for a
low-risk, tax-free investment, secured by the ratemaking authority of
municipal utiliites. 111 Because the participants were in the utility busi
ness, the bondholders could reasonably assume that if the participants'
committee later decided that financing would not be available to com
plete the facility, the participants would nevertheless honor their con
tracts and collect rates to fund the repayment of the bonds. 112 The
court should not have forced the bondholders, therefore, to bear the
risk of termination.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Enabling legislation granted the System the power to enter con
tracts relating to the supply of electricity and it authorized the partici
pants jointly to finance the construction of generating facilities. I \3
Based on the enabling legislation, adequate statutory authority existed
for the Supreme Court of Washington to enforce the agreement be
tween the System and the participants.
The Supreme Court of Washington has enforced municipal con
tracts otherwise ultra vires when necessary to provide security for
bonds, and when the municipal officer had the apparent authority to
execute the contract.114 The facts surrounding Chemical Bank indi
cate that the agreements were necessary to sell bonds and that the
officers who signed the agreements had apparent authority.115 The
court in Chemical Bank, however, refused to enforce the agreement.
When a public contract is void because of a procedural error, the
courts of Washington nevertheless uniformly allow at least partial re
107. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
108. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at 11-2, V-6.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
111. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-16; Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17-18.
112. Brown, supra note 8 at A16, col. 2.
113. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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covery to a party acting in good faith. I 16 The court in Chemical Bank
implied that it would have enforced the participation agreements if the
procedure for participant control of project management had been
more meaningful. ll7 The Chemical Bank court, therefore, failed to
follow mandatory authority.
Finally, because the bondholders expected a secured investment
while the ratepayers chose to take the risk of entering the utility busi
ness, the shortcomings as well as the benefits of the risk should have
fallen on the ratepayers. I IS The participants freely signed contracts in
which they knowingly accepted the risk of termination. I 19 By refusing
to enforce the agreement, the court in Chemical Bank also failed to
give any recognition to the good faith of the bondholders,120 although
one reason cited for not enforcing the agreement was the good faith of
the ratepayers. 121 The permanence of the court's break with precedent
and common sense must await future cases. One can only hope that
the court will reread its earlier cases before it blindly relies on Chemi
cai Bank.

John 1. Ferriter*
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